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The Securitization of Longevity Risk and its Implications for Retirement Security
Abstract
The economic significance of longevity risk for governments, corporations, and individuals has begun to
be recognized and quantified. The traditional insurance route for managing this risk has serious
limitations due to capacity constraints that are becoming more and more binding. If the 2010 U.S.
population lived three years longer than expected then the government would have to set aside 50% of the
U.S. 2010 GDP or approximately $7.37 trillion to fully fund that increased social security liability. This is
just one way of gauging the size of the risk. Due to the much larger capacity of capital markets more
attention is being devoted to transforming longevity risk from its pure risk form to a speculative risk form
so that it can be traded in the capital markets. This transformation has implications for governments,
corporations and individuals that will be explored here. The analysis will view the management of
longevity risk by considering how defined contribution plans can be managed to increase the sustainable
length of retirement and by considering how defined benefit plans can be managed to reduce pension risk
using longevity risk hedging schemes.
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Chapter 8
The Securitization of Longevity Risk and Its
Implications for Retirement Security
Richard MacMinn, Patrick Brockett, Jennifer Wang, Yijia Lin, and
Ruilin Tian
The simplest notion of individual longevity risk is that it is the possibility that one will
outlive one’s accumulated wealth. The risk of outliving one’s accumulated wealth
has many unpleasant consequences for individuals and societies, and because the
risk is increasing it must be addressed. If an individual is covered by a defined contribution (DC) plan, the employee contributes to the plan until retirement. The
employer may or may not match the employee’s contribution. Accumulated wealth
generated during the individual’s working life yields the wealth that the individual
will use to generate a retirement income stream. If the individual is covered by
a defined benefit (DB) plan, the employer guarantees to provide the employee a
designated amount of money upon retirement up until the employee’s death. The
employee may or may not contribute to the plan. The designated amount is based
on the employee’s earnings, length of employment, and age. With a DC plan, the
employee is responsible for ensuring that enough money has been contributed to
the account to avoid longevity risk. With a DB plan, the employer is liable for ensuring that the plan does not run out of money before the employee dies. In the first
case the individual faces the longevity risk, while in the second case the pension
provider faces the longevity risk.
Both plans have distinctive risks and in this chapter we examine the risks from the
perspective of the individual and the institution. Longevity risk is important in part
because of its size; international pension liabilities have been estimated at approximately $21 trillion. Longevity risk is also important because as life expectancy
increases, individuals must increase contributions to their DC plans to mitigate longevity risk and the size of the necessary additional contribution is uncertain, as it
depends in part on how life expectancies change over time. Hence the questions of
interest here include: What happens to the financial well-being of a retired cohort
in the event of an unexpected change in life expectancy or financial stability? What
happens if it does not manage these risks? What happens if it does manage these
risks using currently available instruments? How might it manage the longevity risk
with longevity instruments?
In what follows, we first explore the meaning of longevity risk and consider
its magnitude. Next we consider how mortality and longevity risks have been
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transformed from pure risks to speculative risks. Subsequently we examine longevity risk and financial market risks from the perspective of those who bear them; we
show a need for more longevity instruments in the retail market and some of the
benefits of the existing longevity instruments in the wholesale market for longevity
risk. A final section concludes.

Longevity Risk
Risk can be defined as the negative consequences of uncertainty. Both uncertainty
(multiple possible outcomes) and negative consequences are necessary prerequisites for risk to exist (Baranoff et al. 2009). Since most people find longer life desirable, the term ‘longevity risk’ needs further explication to provide the context in
which longevity presents a ‘risk’ rather than a ‘benefit’ to individuals and/or institutions. Longevity risk is the risk that an individual life span or the average population life span will exceed expectations. The negative consequences of an extended
life span can include outliving one’s friends, diminished mobility and cognitive
flexibility/focus, and outliving one’s financial resources after retirement without
the remedial possibility of rejoining the workforce to produce necessary income
at the later date wherein the probability (or the eventuality) that financial assets
will soon be depleted becomes recognized. Longevity risk has an unsystematic or
idiosyncratic component, as well as a systematic component. The idiosyncratic
component is sometimes described as the risk of an individual outliving one’s accumulated wealth; Milevsky (2006) describes this as ‘retirement ruin.’ The systematic
component corresponds to the more general hazard that people in the aggregate
will live longer than expected (Oppers et al. 2012), thus causing strain on pensions,
employers, and society in general. The systematic component is often referred to as
aggregate longevity risk in the literature (MacMinn et al. 2006; Blake et al. 2013).
The aggregate longevity risk discussed here is the risk of living longer than one
expects; it is also a systematic risk because life expectations are themselves random
variables.
From a financial perspective, the unsystematic component of longevity risk
may be handled by holding a sufficiently diversified and adequately funded asset
portfolio to decumulate during retirement. If life expectancy were certain, the
individual could purchase an annuity certain designed to provide the desired
cash flow for the certain life expectancy. Alternatively, the individual could purchase a bond with the desired flow of coupon payments and leave the principal
repayment as a bequest to beneficiaries but because life expectancy is uncertain,
the individual must design a portfolio of assets to provide a desired cash flow for
an undetermined period of time. This portfolio may consist of equity, bonds,
and possibly a life annuity. The life annuity is an asset that provides a specified
cash flow for the remaining years of an individual’s life. If the unsystematic
component of life expectancy were the only risk faced by an individual then
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a life annuity may be shown to dominate other assets (Yaari 1965). However,
the risk of outliving one’s accumulated wealth is not the only unsystematic risk.
Increased life expectancy includes morbidity (and other) risks as well, implying
that just a life annuity would not cover a long-term illness, dementia, etc., and
therefore a diversified asset portfolio is still needed (Sinclair and Smetters 2004;
Horneff et al. 2009; MacMinn and Weber 2010; Chai et al. 2011).
From a financial perspective, at the firm or society level, aggregate longevity risk
(the systematic component) must be managed. The management choices include
bearing the risk or transferring or trading the risk to some other entity willing to
bear it. In deciding among these alternatives, a determination must be made on
how to price this risk transfer appropriately. This aspect of longevity risk might be
thought of as a trend risk or the risk of underestimating life expectancy (Blake et al.
2013). Alternatively, as noted, we may think of life expectancy itself as a random
variable. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show the record life expectancy for females
as projected by a number of authors and organizations and report the rather surprising result that the record female life expectancy has increased by three months
per year for more than 150 years. Hence, Oeppen and Vaupel also show that each
historical life expectancy prediction has been wrong. With reference to 2005 mortality rates, they note that U.K. mortality rates had declined over the previous
10–15 years by over 2 percent per annum for the age groups over 60. Referring to
the 2 percent decline and using government actuarial department (GAD) figures,
Turner made the following comment about mortality rates (2006: 562):
If they continue at that rate, male life expectancy at sixty-five, currently estimated at nineteen, will reach about thirty by 2050. If the rate accelerates to
3 percent, life expectancy would soar to 37 years. Only if it decelerates to
1 percent would the GAD’s 2002-based principal projection of 22 years in
2050 be correct. So the GAD 2002 projection—a major increase from previous projections—nevertheless still assumed a major deceleration of mortality
rate improvement.
The errors in life expectancy estimates noted here highlight the systematic risk of
longevity risk and the magnitude of the risk.
It is important to understand the vast financial size of the longevity risk problem.
Turner (2006) estimated £2.5 ($4.3) trillion in liabilities subject to longevity risk in
the U.K. Swiss Re has since estimated $20.7 trillion in pension liabilities subject
to longevity risk internationally (Burne 2011). Oppers et al. (2012: 8) provide a
different perspective by calculating the cost of maintaining the retirement living
standard due to aging and longevity shocks as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for advanced and emerging countries. Using the demographic trends
predicted by the United Nations, they note:
In the baseline population forecast and with a 60 percent replacement rate,
the annual cost rises from 5.3 percent to 11.1 percent of GDP in advanced
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economies and from 2.3 percent to 5.9 percent of GDP in emerging economies . . . Taken over the full period, the cumulative cost of this increase because
of aging in this scenario is about 100 percent of 2010 GDP for the advanced
economies and about half that amount in emerging economies.
The authors also observe that a longevity shock of three years would add almost
an additional 50 percent to these cumulative costs of aging by 2050. There is
uncertainty surrounding all of these predictions, but the magnitudes are hard
to ignore.
Ignoring longevity risk is indeed a significant problem. Oppers et al. (2012) use
data from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to estimate the longevity risk faced
by DB plans. They report many plans used outdated mortality tables; the majority
of the plans used the 1983 Group Annuity Mortality (GAM) until recently. Using
out-of-date mortality tables exposes pension plans to longevity risk and risk of ruin.
Dushi et al. (2010) compare pension liability values based on the plans’ longevity
assumptions versus the pension liability values forecast by the Lee–Carter mortality model and find that the outdated mortality tables could understate the pension
liability for a typical male participant by approximately 12 percent.
Longevity risk can be borne or transferred, in whole or in part. The retail market
for longevity risk allows consumers to transfer all or part of the risk with life annuities. In the U.K., this market amounts to £135 billion, but this is because consumers
are required by law to at least annuitize before they turn 75 (Loeys et al. 2007).1 The
retail or life annuity market remains very small in the U.S. since there is no similar
requirement that individuals annuitize when they retire. In fact, this general lack of
a sizable life annuity market has been described as the annuity puzzle, since Yaari
(1965) and Davidoff et al. (2005), among others, have shown that in the absence
of a bequest motive, the life annuity instrument for retirement funding dominates
other asset choices.
A wholesale market for longevity risk would allow pension funds and insurers the
ability to transfer some of the longevity risk rather than bearing it. The U.K. wholesale market has been active and many of the transactions take the form of buyouts
and buy-ins.2 In a buyout, there is a transfer of pension assets and liabilities for a
particular cohort; the cost of the buyout is the difference between the values of the
assets and the liabilities transferred. The difference between the asset and liability
values may be covered by a loan with a known cash flow that is well understood
by investors. In the buy-in, there is a bulk purchase of annuities from an insurer to
hedge the risk of the liabilities associated with one or more cohorts. This immunizes the pension fund from the liability risk for the cohorts covered.
The retail and wholesale markets noted here do provide a transfer mechanism
for the market participants but the mechanisms are crude instruments. More than
one risk is transferred and the risks are aggregated rather than disaggregated; this
generates more concentration of risk and hence amplifies the eventual probability
of insolvency for those concentrations. Given the size of the longevity risks, this
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becomes a new problem that is inconsistent with the history of financial markets.
‘Indeed, the history of the development of risk instruments is a tale of the progressive separation of risks, enabling each to be borne in the least expensive way’ (Kohn
1999: 2).

Securitization
Longevity risk has put corporations, governments, and individuals under a significant financial burden. One common way to manage this risk is securitization
(i.e. isolating the cash flows that are linked to longevity risk and repackaging them
into cash flows that are traded in capital markets). The earliest securitizations were
‘block of business’ securitizations used to capitalize expected future profits from a
block of life business, such as to recover embedded values3 or to exit from a geographical line of business. Cowley and Cummins (2005) introduced the early development of the securitization in life insurance. More recently, Blake et al. (2013)
provided a more comprehensive and global overview of the emergence of the market in traded assets and liabilities linked to longevity and mortality and referred to
this market as the New Life Market. They noted that the New Life Market would
act as a catalyst to help facilitate the development of annuity markets both in the
developed and the developing world and protect the long-term global viability of
retirement income provision.
The idea of mortality securitization was initially proposed by Cox et al. (2000).
The first mortality bond, known as Vita I, was issued by Swiss Re in 2003; it was
designed to hedge mortality risk rather than to hedge longevity risk. Nevertheless,
it provides an important successful example of a Life Market instrument. Vita
I was a success, and led to additional bonds being issued to investors on less
favorable terms.4 Blake and Burrows (2001) were the first to advocate the use of
mortality-linked securities to transfer longevity risk to capital markets. They suggested that the governments should help pension funds and insurance companies hedge their mortality risks by issuing survivor bonds. In 2004, the European
Investment Bank (EIB) and BNP Paribas launched a longevity bond that was the
first securitization instrument designed to transfer longevity risk; ultimately it was
not issued due to insufficient demand. Design issues, such as the introduction of
basis risk, pricing issues, institutional issues, and educational issues, were among
the reasons why the EIB/BNP bond did not launch (Lin and Cox 2008).
The lack of success in issuing long-dated longevity bonds has led to a derivatives
design effort. Various new securitization instruments and derivatives for longevity risk, such as mortality forwards, survivor swaps, survivor futures, and survivor
options have received attention among academics and practitioners.5 In 2007, J.P.
Morgan introduced the first capital market derivative for a longevity hedge; it has
become known as a ‘q-forward.’ A q-forward can be used to hedge the value of the
pension liability or the associated cash flows. More complex, life-related derivatives
can be constructed by using the q-forward as a basic building block. A portfolio
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of q-forwards can be used to replicate and to hedge the longevity exposure of an
annuity or a pension liability or to hedge the mortality exposure for a book of life
business. Following the introduction of a q-forward transaction, a longevity swap
was used to exchange actual pension payments for a series of pre-agreed fixed
payments. This particular swap was legally constituted as an insurance contract
and was not a capital market instrument. There have been 16 publicly announced
transactions of longevity swaps executed between 2007 and 2012 in the U.K.
(Blake et al. 2013).

A Financial Market Model
Suppose the financial market consists of the S&P 500 index, the Merrill Lynch
corporate bond index, and a three-month T-bill. Following Cox et al. (2013), we
describe the return dynamics of the S&P 500 index as A1,t and the Merrill Lynch
corporate bond index as A2,t at time t as a combination of Brownian motion and
a compound Poisson process. The stochastic process of the three-month T-bill
return A3,t is simply described as Brownian motion. The three returns are as follows:
1

N
1

 t+A
A1,t + ∆ |Ft = A1,t exp ( α1 − σ12 − λ1k1 )∆ + σ1∆W1t  ∏ Y1 j
2

 j > N t1

(8.1)

2

N
1
 t+A

A2,t + ∆ | Ft = A2,t exp ( α 2 − σ22 − λ 2 k2 )∆ + σ2 ∆W2t  ∏ Y2 j
2
 j > N t2


(8.2)

1


A3,t + ∆ | Ft = A3,t exp ( α 3 − σ23 )∆ + σ3 ∆W3t 
2



(8.3)

where the constants α1 , α 2 , α 3 and σ1 , σ2 , σ3 are the drift and volatility measures of the S&P 500 return, the Merrill Lynch corporate bond return, and the
three-month T-bill rate given no jumps. The parameter k1 ≡ E (Y1 − 1) is the
expected percentage change in the S&P 500 return and k2 is similarly defined for
the Merrill Lynch corporate bond return if a Poisson event occurs. The parameters
λ1 and λ 2 are the mean numbers of arrivals per unit time of the Poisson processes
N t1 and N t2 respectively. The jump size Y1 j or Y2 j is independent and identically
distributed as a lognormal random variable with the size parameter m1 and the
volatility parameter S1 or m2 and S2. Y1 j and Y2 j are independent for all i and j. The
correlation between the standard Brownian motions of the S&P 500 index and the
Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, W1t and W2t, is captured by the correlation
coefficient ρ12 (i.e. Cov (W1t ,W2t ) = ρ12 σ1σ2t ).
We further assume the three-month T-bill is uncorrelated with either the S&P
500 index or the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index. Based on the annual data of
the S&P 500 and the Merrill Lynch corporate bond provided by the DataStream
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Table 8.1 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates of three pension assets using annual
data
Parameter

Estimate

α1

0.0866

σ1

0.0864
0.2742
−0.3048
0.0000

λ1

m1
s1

Parameter

Estimate

Parameter

Estimate

α2
σ2

0.0691

α3
σ3
ρ12

0.0515

λ2

m2
s2

0.0547
0.0505
−0.1468
0.0000

0.0329
0.6016

Notes: α1 , α 2 , α 3 and σ1 , σ2 , σ3 are the drift and volatility measures of the returns of the S&P
500 index, Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and three-month T-bill. λ1 and λ 2 are the mean
numbers of arrivals per unit time of the Poisson processes for the returns of the S&P 500 and Merrill
Lynch corporate bond indices. m1 (m2 ) and s1 ( s2 ) are the size parameter and volatility parameter
of the lognormal jump size for the return of S&P 500 (Merrill Lynch corporate bond) index. ρ12 is the
correlation coefficient between the geometric Brownian motions of the returns of S&P 500 and Merrill
Lynch corporate bond indices.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

and the three-month T-bill rates from FRED at Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
from 1989 to 2010, we estimate models (8-1), (8-2), and (8-3) to obtain the model
parameters. The estimated parameters are based on annual data and are reported
in Table 8.1.
In what follows we will use these estimates to forecast returns for investor portfolios and for DB plans.

DC Plans
Given the financial market model developed in the previous section, suppose the
individual investor or, equivalently, the retiree selects a portfolio ( ω1 , ω2 , ω3 ) in the
S&P 500 index, the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and the three-month
T-bill, respectively. Given our interest in longevity risk we investigate the length of
a sustainable retirement period under the following two assumptions: (1) The individual invests in a TIAA-CREF-type lifecycle fund;6 (2) The individual invests in a
portfolio based on his own preferences.

Assumption (1): Investment in a TIAA-CREF-type
Lifecycle Fund
The TIAA-CREF Lifecycle Funds consist of a series of target retirement date
funds in five-year increments (2010, 2015, 2020, etc.), where an investor selects
the fund that most closely matches his or her retirement year (e.g. a Lifecycle 2040
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Table 8.2 Asset allocation at different ages (percentage)
Age

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75 and older

Equity
Bonds
Risk Free

50
38
12

49
38
13

48
38
14

47
38
15

46
39
15

45
39
16

44
39
17

43
39
18

42
39
19

41
40
19

40
40
20

Note: All the numbers for equity, bonds, and risk-free assets are in percentages.
Source: TIAA-CREF (2013).

Fund is for an investor planning to retire in or around 2040). The funds are professionally managed and automatically adjust over time. For a retiree who invests in
a TIAA-CREF-type Retirement Fund, the portfolio allocation at different ages is
illustrated in Table 8.2.7

Assumption (2): Investment in a Self-selected Portfolio.
To consider all possible combinations of ω1 and ω2 , we note that short selling is
not allowed. In this case the investment in equity and bond indices satisfies
0 ≤ ω1 + ω2 ≤ 1 .

Investor Portfolio Analysis
We investigate the sustainable length of a retiree’s retirement savings when the
financial market experiences the following two scenarios:

Base Case
Suppose the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has
demonstrated over the past 20 years.8 As such, we use the parameters in Table 8.1
calibrated with historical data to forecast the returns of the three pension assets.
Under the Base case, the stock market will experience about 10/(1/0.2742) = 2.74
crashes every ten years. The crashes in the bond market take place less frequently. Every ten years, an investment in corporate bonds is expected to face 10/
(1/0.505) = 0.51 crashes.9

BaseX2 Case
Suppose financial crashes happen twice as frequently as what the market experienced in the past 20 years. As such, we double the parameters λ1, m1, and s1 for the
stock index and λ2, m2, and s2 for the bond index. Under the BaseX2 case, the stock
and bond markets will experience 5.48 and 1.01 crashes every ten years.
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We simulate the returns of three pension assets from t = 0 when the individual
retires. Based on the United States male population mortality data from 1901 to
2007,10 we assume the maximal age he can live is 103. For each yield path, we simulate 58 years after t = 0. Suppose the initial retirement fund at time 0 is M0 = M and
the retiree withdraws Wd per period starting from t = 1. The value of the retirement
fund Mt at time t depends on the amount invested in asset i at time t−1, Ai,t−1 and its
return in period t and ri,t. Hence,
3

M t = ∑ Ai ,t −1 (1 + ri ,t ), t = 1, 2, 3,...

(8.4)

i =1

and the following equation holds for the retiree:
3

∑A
i =1

i ,t

= M t − Wd , t = 1, 2, 3,...

(8.5)

The sustainable length of the retirement fund, S , is calculated as:

{

}

S = max t ∈ N + | M t ≥ Wd

(8.6)

We run 1,000 simulations with the market parameters to generate 1,000 yield
paths for each pension asset. For each yield path, we calculate sustainable length Si
based on equations (8.4), (8.5), and (8.6). For the random variable S , we investigate three measures (the mean, VaR1%, and CVaR1%) as shown in models (8.7), (8.8),
and (8.9) respectively.
 1000 
E (S ) = E  ∑ Si 
 i =1 

{

(8.7)

}

}

VaR1% (S ) = s = min {s ∈ R |P S ≥ s ≤ 99%

{

CVaR1% (S ) = E S |S ≤ s

}

(8.8)
(8.9)

where S stands for the sustainable length of the retiree’s retirement fund, VaR1% (S )
gives the smallest sustainable period such that the probability of observing a sustainable period greater than it is 99 percent, and CVaR1% (S ) gives the expected sustainable period conditional on the sustainable period being shorter than VaR1% (S ) .
The impact of portfolio allocation on the mean, VaR1%, and CVaR1% of the sustainable length is sensitive to the initial retirement savings M and the annual withdrawal
Wd, which can be explained following two lines of thought that lead to opposite
conclusions. First, due to the risk and return tradeoff, we should be able to observe

The Securitization of Longevity Risk

143

a negative relationship between the mean and CVaR1% (or VaR1%) because the latter
is a measure of risk. Second, the mean and the tail expectation of a random variable could move in the same direction, since both come from the same distribution.

Results for the TIAA-CREF-type Lifecycle Fund
Given an initial retirement fund M = $1,000,000, we assume the retiree invests in
a TIAA-CREF-type retirement fund. That is, the portfolio allocation changes over
time as specified in Table 8.2. The sustainable length of the fund for the Base case
and the BaseX2 case under different annual withdrawal strategies is illustrated in
Table 8.3.
We further investigate how the individual’s funding status would be affected
if the financial market deteriorates due to more frequent crashes (BaseX2 case).
Setting the Base case as the benchmark, the influence of market deterioration on
the individual retirement fund is expressed as the difference of the sustainable
length between the Base and BaseX2 cases. The differences in mean, VaR1% , and
CVaR1% are illustrated in Figure 8.1. Figure 8.1 shows that if the financial markets
25

20

15

10

5

0
$55,000

65,000

75,000

85,000

95,000

Diff Mean (Base-BaseX2)
Diff CVaR_1% (Base-BaseX2)

105,000

115,000

125,000

Diff VaR_1% (Base-BaseX2)

Figure 8.1. Comparison between Base and BaseX2 cases for an investor holding a
TIAA-CREF-type retirement fund.
Note: The Base case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has
demonstrated throughout the past 20 years. The BaseX2 case supposes financial crashes happen twice
as frequently as the market has experienced in the past 20 years. The vertical axis shows the sustainable
periods in years and the horizontal axis is the annual withdrawal.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

35.305
30.558
26.501
23.054
20.281
18.154
16.411
15.016
13.862
12.877
12.024
11.267
10.612
10.008
9.483
9.023

Mean ($)
14
13
12
11
10
10
9
9
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6

VaR1% ($)
13.4971
12.5974
11.4963
10.5974
9.8996
9.395
8.799
8.4963
7.8996
7.5974
6.8996
6.8996
6.2935
5.8996
5.8996
5.5975

CVaR1% ($)
55,000
60,000
65,000
70,000
75,000
80,000
85,000
90,000
95,000
100,000
105,000
110,000
115,000
120,000
125,000
130,000

Withdraw ($)

BaseX2 Case

12.382
11.541
10.795
10.163
9.574
9.068
8.588
8.19
7.801
7.433
7.131
6.846
6.542
6.323
6.07
5.837

Mean ($)
6
5.99
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3

VaR1% ($)

5.3951
5.09
4.9999
4.5975
4.2936
4
4
4
3.8996
3.3951
3.2936
3
3
3
3
3

CVaR1% ($)

Notes: The Base case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has demonstrated throughout the past 20 years. The
BaseX2 case supposes financial crashes happen twice as frequently as what the market experienced in the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

55,000
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65,000
70,000
75,000
80,000
85,000
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95,000
100,000
105,000
110,000
115,000
120,000
125,000
130,000

Withdraw ($)

Base Case

Table 8.3 Sustainable lengths when investing in a TIAA-CREF-type retirement fund
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become more volatile, in the sense that crashes become more frequent, then the
individual can expect to lose more than 20 periods from the sustainable retirement
fund. Figure 8.1 and Table 8.3 also show that, under the same circumstances, a
retiree can lose eight sustainable periods from the VaR1% at the lowest annual withdrawal ($55,000). Finally, the difference in CVaR represents the loss in sustainable
periods in the tail of the distribution sustainable periods and Figure 8.1 shows that
for the lowest withdrawal rate the investor can expect to lose 8.1 of the sustainable
retirement periods; the expected tail loss eventually diminishes with the withdrawal
rate since the number of sustainable retirement periods also diminishes.
When both the initial fund M and annual withdrawal Wd are allowed to change,
we demonstrate the impact of M and Wd on the sustainable number of periods in
Figure 8.2. This figure shows that the BaseX2 case deteriorates from the Base case.
As one expects, the figure shows that the sustainable number of retirement years
increases with M and decreases with Wd. Given M = $1,000,000 and Wd = $55,000,
the expected number of sustainable retirement periods is 35 in the Base case, while
it is about 13 periods if Wd is increased to $100,000.
If the investor realizes returns in the tail of the portfolio distribution, then the
CVaR1%1 yields 13 and 8 periods for these two withdrawal rates respectively in the
Base case. Again given M = $1,000,000, the expected number of sustainable retirement periods is greater than the life expectancy of a 65-year-old U.S. male (i.e.
19.4 years) if he withdraws no more than $75,000 per year; even here, however, a
withdrawal rate of $55,000 will not sustain that 65-year-old to his life expectancy.
Since there is a 30 percent chance that the 65-year-old will live to 90, the M =
$1,000,000 and Wd = $55,000 may be adequate unless he experiences returns in
the tail of the portfolio distribution; then the sustainable retirement period is clearly
inadequate. In the event that crashes are more frequent, Table 8.3 shows that given
M = $1,000,000 and Wd= $55,000, the expected and conditional tail-expected values for sustainable periods become 12.38 and 5.4 respectively. Hence, the expectations fall far short of the life expectancy if the financial market deteriorates, as in
the BaseX2 case. One of the additional difficulties for the investor facing financial
risk and longevity risk is that his perceived life expectancy may fall short of his
actual life expectancy (i.e. the individual may get the trend wrong).

Results for Other Portfolios
Next we suppose the investor selects a portfolio for retirement based on his own
preferences.11 Given an initial retirement asset M at t = 0 of $1,000,000, we show
how the sustainable periods are affected by the annual withdrawal Wd and portfolio allocation under the Base and BaseX2 scenarios. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show
the mean and CVaR1% of the sustainable lengths respectively. The three surfaces
from top to bottom stand for sustainable periods with withdrawal rates of $75,000,
$100,000, and $125,000 respectively. As Figure 8.3 shows, in the Base case, the
initial investment of M = $1,000,000 and Wd = $75,000 allows the investor to
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Note: The Base case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has demonstrated throughout the
past 20 years. The BaseX2 case supposed financial crashes happen twice as frequently as the market has experienced in the past
20 years.

Figure 8.2. Mean and CVaR1% of sustainable lengths given different initial savings and annual withdrawals for a
TIAA-CREF-type lifecycle portfolio.
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Note: The Base case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has demonstrated
throughout the past 20 years. The Base X2 case supposed financial crashes happen twice as frequently as the market has
experienced in the past 20 years. w1 and w2 stand for the proportions of the retiree’s fund invested in equity and long-term
fixed-income securities, respectively.
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generate an expected sustainable retirement of almost 35 periods given the portfolio ( ω1 , ω2 , ω3 ) = (0, 1, 0) (i.e. the investor plunges in the bond index fund). Figure
8.3 also shows that in the BaseX2 case, the investor can generate an expected sustainable retirement of almost 24 years by investing in the portfolio ( ω1 , ω2 , ω3 ) =
(0, 0, 1) (i.e. the investor plunges in T-bills). Again in the case of an initial investment of M = $1,000,000 and Wd = $75,000, Figure 8.4 shows that to maximize
the number of sustainable retirement years in the tail measured by CVaR1% , the
investor should invest 30 percent of his fund in the bond index and the remaining
70 percent in T-bills (i.e., ( ω1 , ω2 , ω3 ) = (0, 0.3, 0.7)) in the Base case; this portfolio
yields almost 18 sustainable retirement periods. Figure 8.4 also shows that in the
BaseX2 case, the investor should choose the portfolio with 10 percent invested in
the bond index and 90 percent invested in T-bills (i.e. ( ω1 , ω2 , ω3 ) = (0, 0.1, 0.9))12
to maximize the number of sustainable retirement periods in the tail; this portfolio yields 11 sustainable retirement periods. In other words, to reduce tail risk, the
investor should choose a more conservative portfolio and invest more in risk-free
assets such as T-bills.

DB Plans
DB plans put longevity risk on the pension provider, not the individual. The DB
provider is a trustee who should act in the interests of the retirement cohort; we
consider one retirement cohort. Since the DB plan is exposed to financial and longevity risks, one objective is to minimize the total unfunded liability (TUL) of the
plan subject to any appropriate constraints. The TUL up to the terminal age of
the retirees is defined as the present value of the sequence of unfunded liabilities.
Hence TUL is
∞

TUL = ∑
t =1

ULt

(1 + ρ)t

where the random variable ULt is the underfunding at time t. We suppose that T is
the retirement date of the cohort. Then for t ≤ T, the plan’s unfunded liability ULt
equals
ULt = PBOt − ( PAt + C ) ,

t = 1, 2,… ,T .

(8.10)

In (8.10) PBOt is the pension benefit obligation and PAt is the date t pension asset
value. When t >T, ULt equals
ULt = PBOt − PAt + B ⋅ t −T pˆx ,T

t = T + 1,T + 2,…

(8.11)
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where B is the survival benefit and t −T pˆx ,T is the conditional expected probability
that a plan member age x at time T survives t − T years when t > T.
Following Cox et al. (2013), who investigate capital market and longevity risks,
we solve the following constrained minimization problem, or equivalently the pension optimization problem:
 ∞ ULt 
Minimize Var  ∑
t 
 t =1 (1 + ρ) 
subject to E {TUL } = 0
CVaRα (TUL ) = τ
0 ≤ ω i ≤ 1, i = 1,2,… ,n
n

∑ω
i =1

i

(8.12)

=1

C ≥0

In (8.12), we require the expected TUL to equal zero. To control the underfunding risk, we impose an α-level conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) constraint on
the total unfunded liability (i.e. E(TUL|TUL ≥ VaR95%) = τ).13 Short selling is not
allowed for the plan, so ωi≥0.

DB Base Case
To obtain the optimal solutions for the Base case for a DB plan given the pension
optimization problem in (8.12) with the Lee and Carter (1992) mortality model and
the pension asset models (8.1), (8.2), and (8.3), suppose the DB plan has members
who all join the plan at age x0 = 45 (t = 0) and retire at age x = 65 (T = 20). The
annual survival benefit payment after retirement is B = $10 million and the pension
fund at t = 0 is $5 million. Following Cox et al. (2013), we set the pension valuation
rate at ρ = 0.08 and the life annuity discount rate at r = 0.05 . In addition, the
plan will amortize the unfunded liability over m = 7 years as in Panteli (2010) and
following Maurer et al. (2009), we set the penalty factors on the supplementary
contributions and withdrawals at ψ1 = ψ2 = 0.2. Our objective is to find the optimal
pension asset allocation and contribution strategies for the plan throughout the life
of the cohort.
We set year 2007 as our base year t = 0 and run a Monte Carlo simulation with
1,000 iterations to generate forecasts for the three financial asset returns and pension liabilities PBOt for t = 1, 2,…. The downside risk parameter is set at 60 and
given τ = 60, the optimal solution for (8.12) is shown in Table 8.4.
To achieve the lowest underfunding variance J and the target CVaR95% (TUL ) of
60, the plan should invest 27 percent of its funds in the S&P 500 index, 43 percent
in the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and the remaining 30 percent of its
funds in three-month T-bills. In addition, given E (TUL ) = 0 , the optimal annual
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Table 8.4 Optimal solution for the Base case with
model (5.13)
C
3.34

ω1

ω2

ω3

J

0.27

0.43

0.30

624.41

Notes: C stands for the normal contribution. J is the value of the
objective function in Model (5-13), which measures the variance
of total unfunded liability. ( ω1 , ω2 , ω3 ) represents the investment
strategy where ω1 , ω2 , and ω3 are the proportions invested in the
S&P 500 index, Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and 3-month
T-bill, respectively. The Base case assumes the financial market
maintains the same trend and volatility that it has demonstrated
throughout the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

contribution is C = 3.34. The total pension cost represents the present value of all
normal contributions, C, supplementary contributions, SC t and withdrawals, Wt .
A higher TPC lowers the plan’s underfunding risk but imposes a higher cost on the
plan sponsor. To achieve the level of CVaR95% (TUL ) = 60, the expected total pension cost is ETPC = 36.08.

Longevity Risk Effect
To examine the adverse effect of an unexpected mortality improvement on the
plan, we change the value of the Base case g in the model to other possible values;
in the Lee–Carter model, mortality is a function of a common risk factor and the
risk factor is described as a random walk with drift g. This drift g may be thought of
as the systematic risk component of mortality. A more negative value of g implies a
more substantial mortality improvement. Given CVaR95% (TUL ) = 60 , the adverse
effect of the longevity risk is captured by the higher E(TPC), since the plan must
adjust E(TPC) upward to reflect higher longevity risk.
Table 8.5 shows the optimization results given different assumptions on g after
solving the optimization problem (8.12). As g decreases from the Base case −0.20
to −0.40, E(TPC) increases notably from 36.08 to 39.06 (i.e. an 8.3 percent rise);
this is due to the higher normal contribution C = 3.62 with g = −0.40, compared to
C = 3.34 with g = −0.20. The increased longevity risk increases the normal contribution and puts more weight in the tails of the underfunding distribution. Hence an
increase in longevity risk increases the variance J of the underfunding distribution.
That variance increases from 624.41 to 709.96 as g decreases from −0.2 to −0.4.
In addition, as g decreases, the plan invests more in the safe asset. Equivalently, the
plan manager must elect a higher portfolio weight for the safe asset, so as to satisfy
his downside risk constraint (that is, the CVaR95%(TUL) = 60).
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Table 8.5 Optimal normal contribution and asset allocation for the Base
case given CVaR95%(TUL) = 60 and E(TUL) = 0 and different mortality
improvement parameters g in the Lee and Carter Model (1992)
g
−0.20
−0.30
−0.40

C

ω1

ω2

ω3

E(TPC)

J

3.34
3.50
3.62

0.27
0.28
0.28

0.43
0.39
0.36

0.30
0.33
0.36

36.08
37.77
39.06

624.41
670.84
709.96

Notes: C stands for the normal contribution. J is the value of the objective function
in Model (13), which measures the variance of total unfunded liability. ( ω1, ω2, ω3)
represents the investment strategy where ω1, ω2, and ω3 are the proportions invested
in the S&P 500 index, Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and 3-month T-bill,
respectively. g is the mortality improvement parameter in the Lee and Carter Model
(1992). E(TPC) represents the expected total pension cost of the plan. The Base
case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has
demonstrated throughout the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

Capital Market Risk Effects
To examine the capital market risk effect on the pension plan, we double the values of the volatility, jump size, and jump arrival rate parameters for the S&P 500
index and the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index in Table 8.1, simulate, and
resolve the optimization model (8.12). The results with the doubled parameter values of the S&P 500 index and the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index are shown
in Table 8.6; they provide important insights for the pension plan with respect to
possible market crashes. Given g equal to the Base case level of −0.20 and a more
volatile capital market, the E(TPC) increases by 16.6 percent from 36.08 in Table
8.5 to 42.08 in Table 8.6. In addition, to meet the downside risk constraint, the
annual normal contribution C increases by 17.8 percent to 3.93 and the proportion
invested in the low-risk three-month T-bill rises by 54 percent to ω3 = 0.47, compared with the Base case levels of C = 3.34 and ω3 = 0.30 in Table 8.5.
It is worth noting that if the adverse longevity and capital market events both
occur, it will push up the expected total pension cost E(TPC) dramatically by
24.9 percent, from 36.08 in Table 8.5 to 45.05 in Table 8.6. These changes could
cause significant financial consequences to the pension sponsor. Both longevity risk
and capital market risk affect the financial stability of a pension sponsor.
Next we investigate how pension hedging strategies can mitigate the adverse
effects arising from these two sources of risk.

Pension Hedging Strategies
Here we investigate two pension longevity risk-hedging strategies: a ground-up
hedging strategy, and an excess-risk hedging strategy. The ground-up hedging
strategy not only reduces longevity risk but also manages capital market risk, as it
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Table 8.6 Optimal normal contribution and asset allocation for the BaseX2
case given CVaR95%(TUL) = 60 and E(TUL) = 0 and different mortality
improvement parameters g in the Lee–Carter Model (1992)
g
−0.20
−0.30
−0.40

C

ω1

ω2

ω3

E(TPC)

J

3.93
4.12
4.22

0.08
0.08
0.08

0.45
0.43
0.42

0.47
0.48
0.49

42.08
43.97
45.05

619.92
660.39
697.99

Note: C stands for the normal contribution. J is the value of the objective function in
Model (5-13), which measures the variance of total unfunded liability. ( ω1, ω2, ω3)
represents the investment strategy where ω1 , ω2, and ω3 are the proportions invested
in the S&P 500 index, Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and 3-month T-bill,
respectively. g is the mortality improvement parameter in the Lee and Carter Model
(1992). E(TPC) represents the expected total pension cost of the plan. The Base
case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has
demonstrated throughout the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

transfers both pension asset and liability risks to pension risk takers. The ground-up
hedging strategy, given a full hedge, is equivalent to a pension buyout, and the
excess-risk hedging, also given a full hedge, is equivalent to a mortality option; see
Cox et al. (2013) for a discussion of both.

The Ground-up or Buyout Hedging Strategy
Suppose the plan implements a ground-up hedging strategy and transfers a proportion hG of pension assets and liabilities to a hedge provider by paying a price
equal to

(

)

h G 1 + δG Ba ( x (T ))

HP G =

(1 + ρ)T

where Ba ( x (T )) is the expected present value of pension payments at retirement
T and δG is the unit hedge cost. Given that the plan pays a hedge price HP G, the
available fund for pension asset investment at t = 0 is PA0G = M G = M − HP G ,
which is lower than that of the no-hedge case with PA0 = M . In our example,
M = 5. With the hedge ratio hG , the pension liability retained by the plan becomes

(

)

(

)

 1 − hG Ba ( x (T ))
t = 1, 2,… ,T

PBOtG = 
(1 + ρ)T −t

G
 1 − h Ba ( y(t)) t = T + 1,T + 2,…
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In this expression, a ( x (T )) is the life annuity factor for age x at retirement T and
a ( y(t )) is the life annuity factor for age y after retirement T with t = T + 1,T + 2,… .
Suppose the plan adopts the optimal asset allocation and normal contribution
strategies shown in Table 8.5. Table 8.7 shows how the ground-up hedging strategy
mitigates the funding downside risk caused by the capital market risk and longevity
risk for the Base case with different hedge ratios.
With the ground-up hedging strategy, when hG > 0, all CVaR95% (TUL ) s in
Table 8.7 are lower than CVaR95% (TUL ) = 60 without hedging. Table 8.7 also
shows that as hG increases, CVaR95% (TUL ) and E(TPC) decrease, indicating a
lower pension risk to the plan. For example, when δG = 0, as hG increases from 0.1
to 0.15, CVaR95%(TUL) decreases from 46.91 to 40.38 and E(TPC) decreases from
34.81 to 34.18. The hedge cost δG, however, reduces the risk reduction effect of the
ground-up hedging. For example, when δG = 0 and hG = 0.15, CVaR95%(TUL) is only
40.38 but it increases to 42.16 when δG = 0.1 and hG = 0.15. As a robustness check,
we also examine the ground-up hedging strategy with different combinations of g
and the pension asset parameters. All of them echo the pattern we observe in Table
8.7. We conclude that the ground-up hedging strategy can effectively reduce the
capital market and longevity risks imbedded in a pension plan.

Table 8.7 Ground-up edging strategy for Base case with g = −0.2
δG = 0
hG = 0.1
C

ω1
ω2
ω3

E(TUL)
E(TPC)
CVaR95%(TUL)
J
HPG

3.34
0.27
0.43
0.31
−7.93
34.81
46.91
625.75
2.36

δG = 0.05

hG = 0.15 hG = 0.1
3.34
0.27
0.43
0.31
−11.90
34.18
40.38
628.73
3.54

3.34
0.27
0.43
0.31
−7.31
35.03
47.50
631.62
2.48

δG = 0.1

hG = 0.15 hG = 0.1
3.34
0.27
0.43
0.31
−10.96
34.52
41.27
637.40
3.72

3.34
0.27
0.43
0.31
−6.68
35.26
48.09
637.58
2.60

hG = 0.15
3.34
0.27
0.43
0.31
−10.02
34.86
42.16
646.26
3.90

Note: C stands for the normal contribution. ( ω1, ω2, ω1) represents the investment strategy
where ω2, ω2, and ω3 are the proportions invested in the S&P 500 index, Merrill Lynch
corporate bond index, and 3-month T-bill, respectively. g is the mortality improvement
parameter in the Lee and Carter Model (1992). TUL and TPC represent the total unfunded
liability and total pension cost of the plan. J is the value of the objective function in Model
(5-13), which measures the variance of total unfunded liability. HPG, hG, and δG are the
hedge price, hedge ratio, and unit hedge cost under the ground-up hedging strategy. The
Base case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has
demonstrated throughout the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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The Excess-risk Hedging or Insurance Option
Strategy
The second pension hedging strategy, the excess-risk hedging strategy, focuses on
transferring the high-end longevity risk. With the excess-risk hedging strategy, the
plan needs to determine a strike level on the s-year survival probability s px ,T for age
x at retirement T in each year t, t = T + 1,T + 2,… above which to transfer a proportion hE of the longevity risk. The conditional expected s-year survival rate, s pˆx ,T ,
is defined as s pˆx ,T = E[ s px ,T px ,T , px +1,T +1 ,… , px + s −1,T + s −1 ] , where px + s −1,T + s −1 is the
one-year survival rate for age x + s − 1 in year T + s − 1.
Suppose at t = 0, the plan purchases a series of European call options with strike levels set at the expected survival rates, s px ,T = E[ s px ,T ], s = 1, 2,… . The option payoffs
in years T + 1,T + 2,… are determined by max{0, B s p x ,T − B s px ,T }, s = 1, 2,… .
Accordingly, to hedge a proportion h E , the plan needs to pay a hedge price of

(

{

)

}

∞
h E 1 + δ E E  ∑ s =1 v s max B s p x ,T − B s px ,T , 0 


HP =
(1 + ρ)T
E

E
where δ E is the hedge cost per unit of longevity risk ceded. With the hedge ratio h ,
the plan’s liability becomes

{

}

 Ba ( x (T )) − Bh E ∑ ∞ v s max 0, p − p
s x ,T
s x ,T
s =1


T
E
PBOt = 
(1 + ρ)

∞
E
s − ( t −T )
max 0, s px ,T − s px ,T
 Ba ( y(t)) − Bh ∑ s = t −T +1 v

{

t = 1, 2,… ,T

}

t = T + 1,T + 2,…

With the hedge price HPE, the fund available for investment at time 0 is reduced
to M E = M − HP E . Again, in our example, we assume M = 5 and the pension
plan implements the optimal asset allocation and normal contribution strategies
shown in Table 8.5. With different combinations of g and the pension asset parameters, we find the same pattern as Table 8.7 with the ground-up hedging strategy
(results available on request from the authors). That is, with a positive hedge ratio
h E, CVaR95% (TUL ) and E(TPC) are lower than those without hedge. However, the
magnitude of risk reduction achieved by the excess-risk hedging strategy is much
lower than that of the ground-up hedging strategy. For example, when g = −0.20,
the pension asset parameters in Table 8.1 and hG = 0.1, CVaR95% (TUL ) = 46.91
with the ground-up hedging strategy. However, at the same levels of g and the
pension asset parameters, the excess-risk strategy only reduces CVaR95% (TUL ) to
56.44 even with a full hedge of longevity risk above the expected survival rates (i.e.,
h E = 1 ). This is explained by the fact that the excess-risk strategy only transfers the
high-end longevity risk but not the pension asset risk, while the ground-up strategy
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reduces both pension asset and liability risks. In many cases, the capital market risk
on pension assets seems to impose a more significant effect on the pension plan
than the longevity risk.

Conclusion
Concern regarding capital market risk often eclipses that due to longevity risk in
pension management. When it comes to retirement issues, however, these two risks
are integrally linked. The number of sustainable years for a retirement portfolio is
determined, in part, by market crashes, changes in market volatility, and changes
in life expectancy. There are instruments to handle capital market volatility, which
include futures and forward contracts to hedge interest rate, currency, and price
risks; there are also derivatives to hedge credit risks, weather risks, and more. There
are insurance instruments to handle the volatility of life; these instruments include
life insurance and life annuities. These insurance instruments have not, however,
been designed to deal with the systematic component of the life risks. If life expectancy unexpectedly increases (e.g. a cure for cardiovascular disease or cancer is
found), then life insurance becomes more profitable for the insurer but life annuities
become less profitable, or may even threaten insurer solvency and adversely impact
retirement plans of individuals and pension funds.
To address these issues, we created scenarios to assess risk for both the individual and the institution. In the case of the individual, scenario analysis showed that
if the individual invested in a lifecycle fund such as that offered by TIAA-CREF
and the financial markets were driven by historical parameters, then a $1 million
investment at retirement combined with a withdrawal rate of $75,000 per year
would yield approximately 20 sustainable years. This is one year more than the
life expectancy of a 65-year-old male in 2013. Most financial planners would
consider this as an inadequate retirement horizon, and many would advocate
planning for a much longer horizon.14 The same analysis shows that one could
only say that the fund would last for ten years with a 99 percent probability.
Similarly, if market parameters were doubled so that crashes occurred more
often and the market was more volatile (i.e. BaseX2 case), one could expect the
fund to last less than ten years and the fund would last for four years with 99 percent probability. This leaves the investor with considerable uncertainty. Yet the
TIAA-CREF-type lifecycle fund held 40 percent in equity, 40 percent in bonds,
and 20 percent in T-bills. The analysis also showed that the investor could select
an alternative portfolio to increase the number of sustainable years. If the investor held all in the bond fund, he could expect the portfolio to continue paying the
same $75,000 per year for almost 35 years. Additionally, if the investor’s returns
were in the worst 1 percent of the portfolio payoffs then he could still expect
almost 18 sustainable retirement years, but only if the portfolio was changed to
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a 30 percent investment in bonds and a 70 percent investment in T-bills. In the
BaseX2 case (i.e. a more volatile market), the same investor could expect the portfolio fund to last almost 24 years if he plunged in the T-bill fund. In this BaseX2
case, if the investor’s returns were in the worst 1 percent of the portfolio payoffs
then he could expect 11 sustainable retirement years, but only if the portfolio
was altered to a 10 percent investment in bonds and a 90 percent investment in
T-bills. These numbers do not account for the possible changes in life expectancy
that will doubtless make even the best numbers here seem even less sufficient.
The DC plans leave the investor with considerable longevity risk, and without the
foresight of increasing the size of the investment fund they can only reduce the
annual withdrawal or change the portfolio to attempt to keep the retirement fund
sustainable for more years. These results emphasize the need for financial instruments that provide a more effective means of transferring some of the longevity
risk to those better able to bear it.
Pension providers bear the longevity risk for DB plans. The pension provider
has a fiduciary responsibility to act in the interest of the plan members and therefore our scenario objective was to minimize pension underfunding subject to constraints on the expected underfunding, short selling, and the size of the tail of the
underfunding distribution. When longevity risk was increased, the solution to the
constrained minimization problem showed an 8.3 percent increase in the expected
total pension cost. When increased capital market risk was also added to longevity
risk, the solution to the constrained minimization problem showed a 24.9 percent
increase in the expected total pension cost.
To mitigate risk, two longevity risk-hedging schemes were considered. The
first was similar to a partial buyout of the pension plan and the analysis showed
that this hedge could lower the pension failure risk. When longevity risk was
increased, the reduction in pension risk between the hedged and unhedged scenarios became more pronounced; when capital market risk was also increased,
the reduction in pension failure risk between the hedged and unhedged scenarios was even more pronounced. The second hedge was a longevity option. Here
there was no exchange of assets; rather, there was only an exchange of liabilities
in the tail. As was the case with the partial buyout strategy, the longevity option
strategy also demonstrated a reduction in pension failure risk that increased with
the size of the hedge.
In sum, improvements can result from managing longevity risk in the context of
both defined contribution and defined benefit schemes. Today’s DC risk management schemes are currently far too limited (e.g. life annuities and reverse mortgages, among others), and additional financial instruments can help fill the gap.
The DB risk management possibilities are limited also, but they have received more
attention in academia and in capital markets. Other hedging schemes must also be
addressed.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

See BBC News (2010).
For more discussion of buyouts and buy-ins, see Blake et al. (2013).
Embedded value is the present value of future profits plus adjusted net asset value.
For example, Vita II–Swiss Re 2005 ($362 million), Vita III–Swiss Re 2007 ($705 million), Vita IV–Swiss Re 2009/10 ($175 million), Vita V–Swiss Re 2012 ($275 million),
Tartan–Scottish Re 2006 ($155 million), and OSIRIS–AXA 2006 ($442 million).
For more on this, see Feinstein (1993), Blake et al. (2006), Wang et al. (2007), and
Coughlan (2014).
TIAA-CREF stands for a Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association–College
Retirement Equities Fund. A lifecycle fund refers to a fund designed to provide long-term
appreciation and capital preservation based on the age and retirement date of the investors in the fund.
Data were retrieved from TIAA-CREF (2013).
In our simulations based on the parameters estimated from 1989–2010 data, the
expected risk premium of S&P 500 over three-month T-bill is around −0.03 each year
in the Base case and −0.20 in the BaseX2 case. The negative risk premium of S&P 500
is consistent with the observation that the return on equities has been 7.6 percentage
points a year lower than that on government bonds in the U.S. since the end of 1999 (The
Economist 2012).
If there is a Poisson event or equivalent crash in the equity market then the expected loss
in the S&P index is approximately 26 percent, while if there is a crash in the bond market then the expected loss in the bond index is approximately 14 percent.
The mortality data for 1901–1999 are taken from the Human Life Table Database
(MPIDR 2013), and for 2000–2007 from the Human Mortality Database (HMD 2013);
these were provided by the University of California at Berkeley and the Max Planck
Institute for Demographic Research.
The analysis is static and so the portfolio is assumed to remain the same through
retirement.
The portfolio (0, 0.05, 0.95) also maximizes the sustainable years in the tail of the portfolio distribution.
The equality constraint is used rather than an inequality constraint so that the variance
is not pushed to zero using T-bills (that would also inflate the total pension cost). The
equality constraint is also important because it generates base cases which we later use
for comparison with two different longevity risk hedges; there we use the same portfolio
of assets generated in the Base case and add a hedging instrument. For this comparison
to work, we use the equality constraint for CVaR and no constraint on the total pension
cost.
See Krueger (2011). Also, former Society of Actuaries President Anna Rappaport is
quoted in Powell (2012) as saying ‘The planning horizon should be long, and if mortality
data is used to pick it, it should not be life expectancy, but rather the age that there is a
90 percent or 95 percent chance of survival.’
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